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Assessment of the National Antimicrobial Resistance 
Monitoring System (NARMS) and its value in critical 
decision-making 
Michael E. Gineva&) 
This paper reviews the United States National Antimicrobial Resistance Monitoring System (NARMS). The data 
from this system have been used as the core basis of a recent proposal to stop the use of fluoroquinolones in poultry 
production, in an effort to reduce or remove a perceived threat to human health due to alleged increasing fluoro- 
quinolone resistance among human Cumpylobacter isolates. An increase in resistance has the potential to render 
fluoroquinolone therapy of human gastrointestinal infections less effective. This review finds no evidence in the 
NARMS data to suggest that a rise in resistant Campylobacter isolates has occurred since fluoroquinolones were 
introduced for use in poultry. In addition, this review identifies a number of shortcomings in the NARMS program. 
These include lack of an overall sampling design, biases in the collection of isolates from animal samples, non- 
compliance of state departments of public health with NARMS protocols, lack of such basic data as genotype 
information on the organisms isolated, and, for animal samples, lack of measurements of bacterial load. Taken 
together, these problems indicate that the present NARMS data very likely overestimate resistance levels, and, at 
best, do not provide reliable information to quantify the extent and temporal trends of antimicrobial resistance in 
Campylobacter and other enteric organisms from human and animal populations. Ways to improve the quantitative 
rigor of the NARMS program and identify other data such as ‘meta’ data for human and animal samples, and data 
on the magnitude of other potential reservoirs of infection, including healthy humans, are suggested. Implementing 
these proposals would greatly enhance the value of the NARMS program as a tool for quantitative decision-making 
and aid in improving the quality of our food supply and human health care. 
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INTRODUCTION 
While there are other ongoing antimicrobial resistance 
monitoring efforts in the USA involving other human 
pathogens (e.g. SENTRY,l TSN,2 Alexander Project3), 
the focus of this discussion is the National Antimicrobial 
Resistance Monitoring System (NARMS), which is the 
major US government-sponsored effort at monitoring 
antimicrobial susceptibility. The purpose of the NARMS 
program, which began in 1996 as a collaborative effort 
by the Department of Agriculture (USDA), the Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), and the 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA), is: to provide 
data on the extent and temporal trends of antimicrobial 
susceptibility to a range of antimicrobials for Salmonella 
and other enteric organisms such as Campylobacter 
species from human and animal populations; to facilitate 
the identification of resistance as it arises; to provide 
timely information on resistance to veterinarians and 
physicians; to prolong the lifespan of approved drugs by 
promoting prudent and judicious use of antimicrobial 
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drugs; and to identify areas for more detailed investi- 
gation.4 
Based to a large extent on data from the NARMS, 
the Center for Veterinary Medicine of the FDA (CVM) 
issued a Notice of Opportunity for Hearing (NOOH) in 
October 2000, proposing to withdraw Auoroquinolones 
from use in poultry in the USA. The pertinent data 
relating to this process will be reviewed along with 
suggestions for an improved NARMS system. 
NARMS DATA AND THE NOOH 
Although not specified as a purpose of the NARMS 
program, the NARMS data have been used specifically 
as the foundation of recent regulatory and legal action 
by the US authorities, and thus they are of more than 
simple academic interest. On 31 October 2000, the CVM 
proposed to withdraw the approval of fluoroquinolones, 
namely sarafloxacin and enrofloxacin, for use in poultry 
by issuing an NOOH in the Federal Register.” The 
CVM’s decision arose from concerns that the reported 
increase (1998-99) in the percentage of human Campy- 
Zobacter isolates found to be fluoroquinolone resistant 
might be directly caused by the use of fluoroquinolones 
in poultry, thus leading to the potential for reduced 
effectiveness of fluoroquinolones in the subsequent 
treatment of campylobacteriosis in humans. 
Table 1 shows the recent data on infection rates and 
ciprofloxacin resistance for Campylobacter jejuni, based 
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Table 1. Recent trends in Campylobacter infection rates and fluoroquinolone resistance 
Year 
Human cases Percentage of 
of Campylobacter human C. jejuni 
infection isolates resistant 
per 100 OOOa to ciprofloxacin c 
Percentage of 
poultry C. jejuni 
isolates resistant 
to cipro floxacin d 
1996 or before 23.5 NA NA 
1997 24.7 12.9 NA 
1998 21.4b 13.1 9.4 
1999 17.5b 17.6 9.3 
2000 15.7 14.0 10.4 
2001 13.8 NA NA 
aMMWR 47(37), 50(13), 51(15).6 bOriginal five FoodNet sites. c2000 Annual Report NARMS, Table 23~.~ 
dFDAIUSDAKDC National Antimicrobial Resistance Monitoring System-Enteric Bacteria (NARMS-EB) 
Veterinary Isolates Final Reports 1998, 1999, 2000. 
on NARMS data.” No trend in the resistance rate for 
either chicken or human samples is apparent. 
There was a marked rise in the incidence of cipro- 
floxacin-resistant human strains in 1999 over 1998, which 
is entirely attributable to C. jejuni isolates (about 
95% of human isolates are C. jejuni) submitted from 
Connecticut (J. Hadler, personal communication). In 
1999, 30% of the 53 C. jejuni isolates submitted by 
Connecticut were classified by the CDC as being 
resistant to ciprofloxacin, while in 2000 only 8.9% of 45 
isolates were classified as such (Table 2). Clearly, the 
1999 NARMS results were significantly impacted by 
Connecticut’s outlying data, compared to the changes 
observed in the other states. Individual state information 
was not available for evaluation for years prior to 1999. 
With the Connecticut issue set aside, the 2000 
NARMS data showed that the level of ciprofloxacin- 
resistant C. jejuni isolates had dropped to 14% from the 
17.6% level in 1999. This substantial reduction of 20% 
confirms that an upward trend of resistance is not taking 
place. 
Fluoroquinolones were first approved for use in 
poultry in late 1995. Unfortunately, data on human 
CumpyEobacter isolates were not collected for the 
NARMS program prior to 1997, so a valid baseline for 
comparison of resistance levels before the approval of 
fluoroquinolones for poultry does not exist. However, 
when the 1997 NARMS data for ciprofloxacin-resistant 
C. jejuni are compared with the 2000 NARMS data, 
Table 2. Percentage of ciprofloxacin-resistant C. jejunifrom NARMS 
data: 1999 compared to 2000 
Percentage resistant C. jejuni 
State 1999 
California 11.6% (n=43) 
Colorado NA 
Connecticut 30.0% (n=53) 
Georgia 20.0% (n=49) 
Maryland 15.0% (n=20) 
Minnesota 23.0% (n=35) 
New York 11.5% (n=52) 
Oregon 13.8% (n=29) 
Tennessee 0% (n=13) 
n=total number or C. jejuni isolates. 
2000 
17.1% (n=41) 
0% (n=28) 
8.9% (n=45) 
21.3% (n=47) 
50.0% (n=2) 
24.5% (n=49) 
6.5% (n=46) 
20.0% (n=25) 
4.3% (n=23) 
there is no statistically significant difference (chi-square) 
in the C. jejuni isolates reported by the CDC as being 
resistance to ciprofloxacin (P-value=0.81). In other 
words, there has been no measurable increase in the 
percentage of human C. jejuni isolates that are classified 
by the CDC as resistant to ciprofloxacin over the years 
monitored. 
Even though the CDC had not monitored for 
Cumpylobacter resistance prior to 1997, levels of 12% 
were reported for human isolates as early as 1992-95 in 
Wisconsin,‘o and 6% in Minnesota in 1995.” 
Even if one assumes that the NARMS data constitute 
a reliable basis for regulatory decisions, it is difficult, 
based on these observations, to see how Campylobacter 
resistance levels in humans can be attributed to the use 
of fluoroquinolones in poultry. The incidence rate of 
human campylobacteriosis, per 100 000 population, has 
steadily declined since 1997 (Table l), while at the same 
time, per capita consumption of chicken has steadily 
increased. If consumed poultry were the primary source 
of campylobacteriosis for humans, the incidence rate per 
100 000 should be increasing with increased per capita 
consumption. The opposite is occurring. 
COMPONENTS OF THE NARMS PROGRAM 
In order to evaluate the usefulness of the NARMS data, 
it is important to understand how the data are collected. 
The NARMS program has three components. Veterinary 
samples, which form part of the USDA animal NARMS 
program, are collected to either evaluate antimicrobial 
susceptibility in flocks or herds (mostly fecal samples) or 
to determine antimicrobial susceptibility in an organism 
that has caused disease (primarily tissue samples from 
dead animals). These will not be considered here, because 
these samples are composed of Salmonella and other 
enteric organisms, and are generated from samples sub- 
mitted on an ad hoc basis. That is, there is no underlying 
sampling design (USDA staff, personal communication). 
Slaughter samples are generated by the USDA’s 
Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS).12 In this 
monitoring program, samples consist of either carcass 
swabs (beef, swine, turkeys), whole carcass rinses 
(chickens), or ground meat samples. The primary micro- 
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bial focus comprises Salmonella spp., but Campylobacter 
spp. are also isolated from the same samples. The 
minimum inhibitory concentrations (MICs) for cipro- 
floxacin and 16 other antimicrobial agents are deter- 
mined for all slaughter isolates. 
Human NARMS samples (1999 Protocol)13 are 
provided by 1.5 participating public health laboratories 
representing the states of California, Colorado, 
Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Kansas, Maryland, 
Minnesota, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, 
Oregon, Tennessee, Washington and West Virginia, plus 
independent public health laboratories representing 
Los Angeles County and New York City. These sites are 
instructed to select the following isolates: every 10th 
non-typhi Salmonella isolate; every Salmonella typhi 
isolate (one isolate per patient); every 10th Shigella 
isolate; and every fifth E. coli 0157 isolate. Each state is 
also instructed to submit the first Campylobacter sample 
received each week. These isolates are forwarded to 
the CDC for susceptibility testing. MICs are determined 
for the same 17 antimicrobial agents as in the animal 
NARMS program, using a microbroth dilution tech- 
nique. 
THE UTILITY OF THE NARMS AS A 
QUANTITATIVE MONITORING TOOL 
One of the stated goals of the NARMS is for the data to 
be used as a quantitative monitoring tool; therefore, this 
paper examines the system to evaluate its utility for this 
purpose. The three components of the program are 
evaluated individually, followed by an assessment of the 
consequences of these cumulative approaches. Finally, 
some suggestions for the improvement of NARMS are 
made. 
Problems in the animal NARMS data 
The problems with the animal NARMS can be found in 
several areas. One major difficulty is that, for the FSIS 
slaughter samples, slaughter facilities are initially sampled 
at random. However, if a given slaughter facility fails to 
meet the relevant performance standard for microbial 
contamination, it is resampled until it passes.14 That is, 
‘clean’ plants are sampled once, while ‘dirty’ plants can 
be sampled many times. Thus, slaughter samples are 
biased towards dirty facilities. Moreover, a bias towards 
dirty facilities will skew the data, and may lead to an 
overestimate of antimicrobial resistance frequency. 
To demonstrate this, consider a hypothetical chicken- 
processing facility where 20% of incoming carcasses are 
contaminated. Now let us assume that there is significant 
cross-contamination, so, if any chicken in a ‘lot’ of five 
chickens is initially contaminated, all will be con- 
taminated when testing occurs. Thus our contaminated 
fraction (C) is given by: 
C=l - (0.8)5=0.672 (1) 
Now, let us further assume that 5% of the carcasses are 
contaminated with resistant bacteria. Since 20% were 
contaminated and 5% are contaminated by resistant 
bacteria, the resistance frequency is 25 % (5 %/20%). For 
a batch of five chickens to be nonresistant, all five must 
be nonresistant. Thus, the resistant fraction, R, of carcass 
isolates is given as: 
R=l - (0.95)5=0.226 (2) 
Now our resistance frequency in samples is: 0.226/ 
0.672=0.336. That is, the measured resistance frequency 
has increased from 25% to 33.6% because of cross- 
contamination. 
Simple random sampling, even without a bias 
towards dirty facilities, is a questionable strategy. Con- 
sider a ‘population’ of facilities from different areas of 
the country, e.g. the eastern, central and western regions. 
We also have different kinds of facilities; for simplicity, 
let us say small, medium, and large. This breakdown 
would give a total of nine strata (three facility types by 
three regions). A simple random sample might have 
many observations from small, eastern facilities in one 
year, and many observations from large, western facilities 
in another year. That is, the make-up of the sample 
changes from year to year. If we, instead, took a stratified 
random sample, we would randomly select a fixed 
number of facilities from each stratum. Thus the make- 
up of our sample is more stable from year to year. We 
could also calculate weighted resistance rates Rw, using 
the rate determined for each stratum and a weight 
appropriate for that stratum. Here, the weight might be 
the proportion of total chicken production coming from 
the stratum: 
Rw=C WIJ x RI,J (3) 
It is also true that the present animal NARMS data are 
quite limited in scope. That is, all that is determined 
for each sample is the presence/absence of microbial 
contamination, the type of organism(s) isolated, the 
MICs for the isolate, and the origin of the sample in 
terms of the food animal it was derived from and whether 
it was a carcass swab or wash or a ground meat sample. 
It would be useful to determine how many bacteria, 
in terms of colony-forming units/cm2, were present. 
Techniques such as dilution assays can give us this 
information.ls Genotype information for the organ- 
isms isolated would also be useful. A recent studyI 
suggests that only certain Cumpylobacter genotypes infect 
humans. This work also suggests that only 20% of human 
Campylobacter isolates are genetically related to samples 
from chickens. Even for the present FSIS data, it would 
be useful to have collateral information for each sample 
(often referred to as ‘meta-data’) on collection date, 
region and facility type, and whether or not a given 
sample was a random sample or a compliance-monitor- 
ing sample. 
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Problems in the human NARMS data 
‘Ihe general problems in human NARMS data are the 
lack of a rigorous sampling plan and irregular com- 
pliance, That is, resistance is assessed from isolates pre- 
pared by hundreds of local clinical laboratories, which 
send samples to municipality or state public health 
laboratories, which in turn forward samples to the CDC. 
At the level of the local laboratories, there is no 
common protocol that must be followed for the isolation 
of organisms. This is a potential problem, because the 
media used in the isolation of organisms may contain 
antibiotics that can select for antimicrobial resistance. 
For example, some media may contain nalidixic acid, 
which, like ciprofloxacin, is a quinolone. Even if a 
medium does not contain an antibiotic in the same 
‘family’ as a compound of interest, selecting bacteria 
for resistance to one antimicrobial may also select for 
resistance to a chemically unrelated antimicrobial if the 
two traits are genetically linked. 
There is also strong evidence that state public health 
departments do not consistently comply with NARMS 
protocols. Perhaps the best example of this is the 
NARMS protocol which requires that the state shall 
submit the first Campylobacter sample received each 
week. Thus, each state should submit at most 52 samples. 
However, in 1999, New York submitted 54 samples, and 
Connecticut submitted 53, while Maryland generated 
only 22 samples. Connecticut has a population of about 
3.4 million, while Maryland has a population of about 
5.3 million. The CDC estimates that the overall rate of 
Campylobacter infection is 6.8/100 000 for the state of 
Maryland,” which would imply about 340 cases/year in 
Maryland, or about 6.5 cases/week. This rate implies that 
the probability of getting zero cases in a week is about 
0.0015, or 1 in 665. Thus, Maryland would be expected to 
generate 52 samples in most years. 
In the year 2000, the Minnesota Department of 
Health (MDH) collected 1028 isolates of Campylobacter 
spp. Eleven per cent (ll%), or 113, of these isolates 
were resistant to ciprofloxacin.rs The MDH submitted 
56 isolates to the CDC, but the basis or criteria for their 
selection was not clear. Of these, 12, or 21.4%, were 
resistant to ciprofloxacin. I7 The probability of seeing 12 
or more resistant isolates in 56 samples when the true 
resistance frequency is 11% is about 0.017 (1.7%). 
These are examples of non-compliance with pro- 
tocols. Non-compliance is an issue, because states may 
tend to submit interesting samples in disproportionate 
numbers. Since samples submitted to state health 
departments have already been tested for antimicrobial 
resistance, resistant strains may be more interesting. The 
isolates submitted by Minnesota clearly demonstrate an 
inexplicable significant bias that has skewed the national 
NARMS results to a higher level of resistance than is 
actually occurring. 
As mentioned earlier in this paper, another in- 
teresting observation is found in the data from 
Connecticut. The 1999 Connecticut data appear to have 
solely contributed to the NARMS spike. This spike was 
interpreted by the CVM as a national upward trend. If 
the Connecticut data for 1999 had shown a more typical 
five out of 53 resistant isolates in 1999, the frequency for 
Connecticut would have been 9.4%, and the national 
resistance frequency would have been 13.7% instead of 
17.3 % .That is, the 1999 ‘spike’ was entirely explained by 
Connecticut. It is unlikely (P=O.O3) that the difference 
in the Connecticut submissions was due to chance, but it 
could well have been a result of selection bias. The US 
General Accounting Office has also expressed concern 
about state compliance with monitoring protocols.” 
Medical practice may also exaggerate resistance 
frequency. Doctors sometimes treat enteric disease with 
an empirical approach. That is, they prescribe antibiotics 
that are likely to cure the patient, and only try to isolate 
organisms if treatment fails. The problem here is that if 
a substantial fraction of isolates are treatment failures; 
this will exaggerate the resistance frequency of the 
initial isolates. Also, fecal cultures may be ordered more 
often in populations with good medical insurance. If 
these populations frequently travel to foreign countries, 
this will also elevate the resistance frequency. 
As mentioned in the discussion of animal NARMS 
data, relevant meta-data are not collected for isolates. 
The same is true for the human NARMS data. Foreign 
travel is a risk factor for both enteric infections and 
antimicrobial resistance.20J1 It is important to know 
whether foreign travel occurred in the month before the 
patient got sick. Recent treatment with antibiotics is also 
a risk factor.20 Therefore, it is also important to know 
whether a patient was treated with antibiotics in the 
month before the isolate was obtained, or indeed 
whether the patient took antimicrobial prophylaxis (an 
increasingly common practice). Additionally, it is 
important to know the gender, age and ethnicity of the 
patient from whom the isolate was collected. Finally, as 
for animal NARMS samples, genotyping of the organism 
would also be desirable, because it assists in identifying 
the source of the infection. 
General issues 
One potential pitfall with interpreting data from the 
NARMS program is to be guided by ‘well-known facts’ 
that are arguably wrong. For example, there is a tacit 
assumption that most sporadic Campylobacter infections 
result from eating undercooked meat (especially 
chicken). 22 This can introduce bias when trying to collect 
data relevant to assessing the source of antimicrobial 
resistance. That is, we ‘know’ that eating chicken is a risk 
factor for enteric infection, so case-control studies, 
which constitute the usual vehicle for identifying risk 
factors in sporadic infections, always investigate chicken 
consumption. However, in outbreak situations, where 
the cause is easier to identify, the sources of infection 
often turn out to be things like clover sprouts,23 or 
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unpasteurized milk. 22 This is the problem of the ‘usual 
suspects’. 
l We always ask about chicken, because it is important. 
l We may not ask about other factors, because they are 
‘unimportant’. 
l The result is overidentification of ‘common’ risk factors 
and underidentification of ‘rare’ risk factors. 
Recall that Nadeau et ali6 showed that only 20% of 
Cumpylobacter isolates from people were genetically 
compatible with those found in chicken. 
A second ‘fact’ is that people do not get 
Campylobacter infections from other people. Consider 
Figure 1, taken from Centers for Disease Control.r7 
Both Campylobacter and Salmonella infection rates are 
highest in children. Some might argue that this is because 
reporting is better for small children, but, considering 
the fact that the overt symptom of enteric infection is 
diarrhea, which is relatively common in small children, 
another explanation might be that children get in- 
fections from other children. If part of the elevated rate 
in small children is indeed due to child-child trans- 
mission, this raises the question of adult transmission. 
Moreover, the ecology of Cumpylobacter suggests that 
there is a human reservoir of Campylobacter resulting 
from asymptomatic transient colonization of humans, as 
well as Campylobacter being shed by postsymptomatic 
victims of enteric disease. This information suggests that 
data on the prevalence of enteric pathogens such as 
Campylobacter and Salmonella in healthy people would 
be useful. 
IMPROVING THE NARMS PROGRAM 
From the evidence provided and the obvious system 
deficiencies, the NARMS system is useful as a quali- 
tative monitoring system which can give advance 
warning of new pathogens, but it is not useful as a 
quantitative tool. The present data cannot be reliably 
used to quantify the extent and temporal trends of 
antimicrobial susceptibility in Cumpylobacter and other 
enteric organisms from human and animal populations. 
However, the quantitative problems with NARMS can 
be remedied by the following approaches. 
Sample designs 
For entities such as slaughter samples, stratified random 
sampling from a set of strata chosen to be statistically 
representative would be a good start. For human 
NARMS, one might consider a set of sentinel labora- 
tories which are paid to participate in the program and 
which follow rigorous protocols for the isolation of 
organisms. These laboratories should be representative 
of both the human populations of interest and of the 
varieties of medical practice (HMOs, etc.) of interest. 
They should also be periodically audited for compliance 
with NARMS protocols. The design suggested is essen- 
tially a permanent multicenter clinical study. 
Better data 
More comprehensive data are also needed. For animal 
samples, contamination level (colony-forming units 
(CFUs)/cm2) and genotype data are important. 
Wassenaar24 suggests that genetic studies should use 
more than one type of genetic analysis to determine 
likely sources of microbial contamination. Likewise, 
for human isolates, both the organism involved and 
genotype data are needed. It would also be useful to 
determine whether a human reservoir exists, and, if it 
does, to monitor this reservoir. In the same way, one 
might wish to consider other potentially large animal 
reservoirs, such as urban bird populations. Information 
on food as eaten (e.g. supermarket samples) would also 
be useful. Here too, contamination level (CFUs/cm2) 
and genotype data are needed for the strains involved. 
In food as eaten samples, one should not fall into the 
trap of sampling only meat (because we ‘know’ that this 
is the problem). Fresh vegetables and other raw food 
products need to be sampled as well. 
-+ Campylobacter + Salmonella 
4 l-9 IO-19 zP!o-3 3039 4c49 33-59 6oc 
Age group (years) 
Figure 1. lncidences of Campylobacter and Salmonella infections by age group, FoodNet sites, 1999.14 
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Better meta-data 
For example, with slaughter samples, information is 
needed on the exact time, place and facility charac- 
teristics for each sample. If FSIS isolates are used, 
information is needed on whether the sample was a 
random check or a failure retest. For human isolates, 
information on recent foreign travel and antibiotic 
treatment is essential. Information on the demographic 
characteristics of the individual from whom the sample 
was taken and the time and place of the sample is also 
important. 
Better reporting 
At present, NARMS reports consist of a short intro- 
ductory text section followed by tables and bar graphs 
of MIC distribution for different combinations of anti- 
microbials and organisms. It would be useful to see 
comparisons of animal, food and human data by species 
and antimicrobial susceptibility. 
All raw data should be made available to any 
interested party, while protecting confidentiality where 
necessary. At present, the NARMS data are not of 
sufficient quality to be of value for detailed statistical 
analysis, but if the data proposed here were collected, 
they could represent a valuable resource for a variety of 
research programs. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The main observation concerning the NARMS-based 
NOOH is that trying to make important decisions on the 
basis of limited data can be costly in a variety of ways. 
For example, if we ban antibiotic use in animals because 
of an increase in human resistant infections, whereas the 
increase resulted, in fact, from a human reservoir, there 
is no public health benefit, and there is substantial cost 
to both drug and animal producers. Moreover, this 
decision may be regarded as gospel, rather than a result 
of a series of cumulative errors and conclusions. If 
we start with bad retrospective monitoring data that 
exaggerate resistance frequency, and then decide that a 
drug is to blame, leading us to ban the drug, and then do 
a careful, well-designed prospective study to evaluate 
post-ban resistance frequency, we will be able to declare 
success, because resistance frequency is lower after the 
ban than before. There is some suggestion that this may 
already have happened.25 
Good data are essential to the decision-making 
process, and we trust that the comments offered here 
will help improve the data infrastructure in the 
important problem area of antimicrobial resistance. 
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PANEL DISCUSSION 
M. Ginevan: I think that until it is broadly understood 
that the data that we have are not adequate for the 
decision-making process, people are not going to see the 
need for coming forward with additional resources. If 
the data indicate that the trends have gone up and 
regulatory action is therefore needed, we might as well 
be regulating with a roulette wheel. We have to inform 
the process. This is expensive, but so is the cost of a bad 
decision. I have had this conversation with utility 
companies and people doing air quality monitoring or 
water quality monitoring; doing a good job isn’t cheap, 
but doing a bad job may be more expensive. 
C. Thornsberry: You are absolutely right about the 
laboratories; for example, we have paid laboratories for 
a certain number of isolates, and received 100 isolates, 
which are all the same. What the laboratory has done is 
to send one organism 100 times. Generally, you can pick 
those things out without having to do site visits all the 
time. 
M. Ginevan: To amplify your earlier question, once you 
realize what the spectrum of what you want to know is, 
you can hire somebody like me who can minimize 
sampling costs. You are talking about genotyping, and I 
won’t say we do every organism, but we do say ‘what is 
the significant subset’; people like you have the expertise 
to inform people like me, so that we can plan a study to 
provide better information. There is always a conflict 
between the data we need to have and the money we 
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have to spend. No-one is going to clean up the mess until 
you realize that there is a mess. 
C. Thornsberry: One of the issues that you brought up 
is very important and will be difficult to change; that 
is, we only test those organisms that are causing disease. 
You mention the CDC; the CDC strongly believes that 
disease-causing organisms are the only ones that you 
should test. I totally disagree with that. An organism 
that is not causing disease can be as resistant as one 
that does, but it is going to be difficult to change the 
CDC’s attitude and, I suspect, that of other government 
organizations. 
M. Ginevan: What I am trying to do is hold up a target. 
If no-one holds up a target, it is really difficult to know 
where to aim. 
P. Fedorka-Cray: I have several comments and 
clarifications. NARMS now collects E. coli and 
enterococci samples. They are collected only from 
poultry, and we have a significant number of isolates and 
a significant amount of data that we would like to put on 
the website. The problem that we have with some of 
the information is that, before we post it, we need to 
understand what we have. We have a lot of mixed 
cultures: there are mixed populations in any microbial 
sampling program, so, as generic E. coli are being 
selected for, there will be in fact many different generic 
E. coEi strains. There are toxin-producing E. coli and 
other bacteria that will cause gastroenteritis. Since we 
are collecting these samples not from the spent rinse 
aids that are used for the Salmonella programs and we 
find E. coli, we pre-select for the resistant population 
when we ask for a culture to be submitted. However, 
more important questions from a microbiological 
standpoint are which colony is tested and which colony 
is picked for resistance testing. We are in the process of 
trying to determine what the population might be in any 
one sample, and how many isolates we would need to 
select from a particular number of samples over time to 
determine what the population really is. Another point 
is that many people talk about enterococci, but really we 
need to do speciation. Not only does NARMS contain 
the veterinary diagnostic isolates and slaughter isolates, 
but it also has an on-farm component, and these are 
supposedly collected from healthy animals. This forms 
part of the NARMS program, and this also has 
limitations; we have asked for sentinel on-site, on-farm 
testing, but stratified random protocols are not in place 
yet. 
Slaughter samples also include ground product. If 
you read the relevant information, you will see that this 
is raw product collected from slaughter and processing 
plants. Unfortunately, with FSIS, we had a period of 2 
years where we did not have a liaison that was assisting 
us in the program. Now we have very good liaisons, 
and we have very open and willing participants who 
entertain all of our questions. We know now that over 
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the last 3 years they have collected over 54 000 ground 
beef samples, so we have raw data. Most of what we are 
calling beef or cattle is ground beef, and we are breaking 
down the data from those previous years by commodity, 
so that we will know whether the sample is a rinse aid, 
a carcass swab, ground beef, or a ham. We have some 
eggs that are submitted occasionally, so we will have 
much more information. Part of the problem with the 
reporting is that those reports, when we print them, are 
320 pages long. Those are the general summaries. When 
we start to break everything down by serotype, by 
species, by clinical status, and by commodity within 
animal source, we get reports that approach 1000 pages. 
We haven’t come to any decision as to how to post all 
that information on the website in a timely manner, 
because getting the ‘broad-brush’ information that you 
see on the website takes at least 6 months from the time 
the program completes its last sample. 
Another problem is that the program often doesn’t 
complete its last sample until June the following year. 
For instance, we have not completed our 2001 data yet, 
because we don’t yet have the last serotypes in from our 
slaughter samples. They probably won’t be available 
until the May/June period. 
M. Ginevan: Would it be practical to put the data on the 
web instead of the reports? 
P. Fedorka-Cray: There are many other problems 
associated with posting raw data on the web, and the 
analysis of that data; and I am not sure how we would 
maintain the confidentiality of some of that information, 
and that is an important aspect of this program. I just 
think these are important things that the group needed 
to know about the program. In 2001, there was no 
Cumpylobacter FSIS program. From 1997 to 2000, there 
were two different programs being conducted by FSIS, 
a baseline program and a monitoring program. In 2001, 
we started collecting Cumpylobacter isolates from the 
Salmonella spent rinse aids. Those will have higher 
resistance associated with them, because we have 
changed the methodology. These data are not com- 
parable with all the previous years’ data when looking 
at percentage resistance over time. 
We have asked for the A and B lists from FSIS, data 
that we presented at the Salmonella/Newport closed 
government meeting 2 weeks ago. In time, we will have 
regional information for all of our data. We will be doing 
seasonal analysis of these data. FSIS does collect some 
quantitative information on numbers and levels of 
bacteria. We do not have that information for resistant 
bacteria, because of the cost. This is a big monetary 
issue; we need to get people to collaborate in sending 
samples in and setting up stratified programs, sampling 
programs where we have sentinel sites submitting the 
same types of isolates all the time. 
We met with the CDC on 16 January and discussed 
all of our microbiological protocols. A report from that 
will be forthcoming and posted on the web. You will be 
able to see what the CDC uses and what we use for our 
culture methods, and what the differences are. 
C. Thornsherry: I think, for those of us who do surveil- 
lance for antimicrobial resistance, most of what you 
have said is known. We know the shortcomings, for the 
most part. Maybe the problem is that we are the only 
ones. There are some problems for me in what you want 
to do about this, and most of them are related to cost. To 
do any of this is extremely expensive, and if you want to 
do things like getting adequate numbers etc., the cost 
rises spectacularly. You cannot imagine, I think, the cost 
of doing genotyping on every organism that you isolate. 
What genotyping now almost comes down to is that 
you do the studies and then you pick selected organisms 
and try to find somebody to pay for genotyping on those. 
I think that to fix a lot of these problems is not easy 
because of money. 
